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Individualised claims of conscience, clinical judgement and best interests 
Stephen W Smith 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Conscience is an important subject in medical law and ethics. We debate its impact and influence 
on some of the most crucial and controversial issues in healthcare. However, we often do so in a 
limited fashion. We consider only a particular type of conscience claim and our understanding of 
conscience and conscience-based decision-making is likewise limited. For example, in a pair of 
famous articles, Julian Savulescu argues that doctors and other healthcare practitioners should 
not be entitled to make a conscientious objection to treatment that a patient might want [22], 
[23]. He argues that doctors are required to perform a professional duty and therefore should 
undertake all tasks which might be clinically indicated, even if it offends their conscience to do it. 
[22], [23]. If doctors or other health care professionals do not want to provide particular 
treatments for conscience-based reasons, then they can either specialize in a medical field which 
does not require that particular treatment (e.g. those who object to abortions should specialize in 
something other than obstetrics or gynaecology) or , if the complaint is substantial enough, leave 
the medical profession altogether. Ultimately, he argues that a doctor’s conscience is never 
sufficient reason to override the best interests of the patient [22], [23]. 
 
Savulescu does not indicate specifically which kinds of conscience claims he means to address in 
his articles. However, it appears that the kinds of claims he is discussing are those most 
standardly considered within medical law and ethics: conscientious objections to performing 
abortions, IVF, or assisted dying. These are usually generalizable, predictable, rule-based claims 
in which an individual practitioner objects to what is otherwise standard medical treatment. They 
are, thus, the kinds of objections which are recognised in the Abortion Act 1967 [1] or the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 [12]. 1 Those who hold this kind of conscientious 
objection usually object to a particular treatment as a matter of principle and individual 
circumstances do not matter in the calculation. Treatment, then, is objected to as a class of 
action rather than a specific instance. Sometimes, an individual might objects to only one kind of 
a more general class (e.g. a doctor might objects to providing abortions in cases of foetal 
abnormality) but they are still based upon generalised characteristics rather than individual 
circumstances. 
 
Not all conscience claims, however,   fit within this mould. Some conscience claims are, instead, 
based upon how a set of rules apply in a particular case at a particular time [25]. These might be 
instances where a treatment, which usually does not generally raise a conscience claim for the 
particular practitioner in question, becomes problematic due to circumstances which might not 
have been predictable or subject to a single rule easily applied in advance. For example, a doctor 
might not object to a patient receiving a particular treatment when the patient first presents. 
However, it may reach a point where the doctor believes that treatment, which was not 
previously objectionable, has become so due to changes in the patient’s condition, the 
effectiveness of the treatment or simply because the doctor believes the treatment has reached ‘a 
bridge too far’ [25]. Thus, for example,   a doctor might have no systematic objection to the use 
of a particular life-sustaining treatment, but objects in a particular case with a particular patient 
                                                 
1 The Abortion Act 1967 specifies in section 4 that doctors may refuse to participate in the 
provision of abortion services. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 in section 38 
allows doctors to conscientiously object to providing any ‘activity governed by this Act’. This 
would include providing, for example, IVF services. 
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because the standard side-effects in this specific case are too distressing. These cases are not 
covered by Savulescu’s claim, nor are they generally considered when healthcare lawyers discuss 
conscientious objections [25]. Consequently, it may not be unclear how these sorts of objections 
should be characterised, either within a legal   or ethical framework or within any ethical system 
that we might wish to consider.     
 
This article will explore these more individualised claims in two ways. First, it will explore 
whether these kinds of claims should properly be considered claims of conscience as opposed to 
a different sort of claimsomething else. Second, it will explore how , if these are truly conscience 
claims, these claims might interact with the other sorts of judgements that we expect doctors to 
make in these sorts of cases. In other words, it will look at how we might address Savulescu’s 
concerns about the role of conscience in conjunction with professional standards, clinical 
judgment and the best interests of the patient. 
 
II. The Nature of Conscience 
 
We need to begin with an idea of whatby understanding conscience is. José Miola has presented 
an intial definition he believes to be useful in deliberating the place of conscience in medical law 
[19]. According to Miola, for a decision to be based on conscience, two things are required. First, 
the decision cannot be based on ‘professional judgement’ [19]. By ‘professional judgement’ Miola 
means technical medical skill.2 These are matters which are within the exclusive purview of a 
particular profession – in this casei.e., doctors. Miola argues that for a conscience-based decision 
to be one of conscience, it needs, instead, to be based on values. Second , for Miola, a decision is 
conscience-based if the doctor has ‘the liberty to make her own decision’ [19]. Miola argues that 
there must be more than one option available to her so that a choice is possible. There are 
problems, however, with both of Miola’s criteria. The second is problematic because choice does 
not necessarily require other options.3 All that it actually requires is an authorial connection to 
the decision [7], [8]. If the doctor in question would claim ownership of the decision, then we 
can reasonably call it one where there was a choice, even if there were no other options available. 
More importantly, the first criterion is missing an essential word – ‘moral’. Decisions are only 
conscience-based if they encapsulate a moral value, not just values in general. A doctor, for 
example, may choose to use green scrubs in preference to blue because of an aesthetic value. 
That would appears to fit Miola’s criterion – it is a choice based upon a value - but it does not 
seem likely that we would not call such a decision conscience-based. In order fFor something to 
be classified as conscience-based, then, it must be moral or ethical in nature. It does not, of 
course, have to belong to a particular ethical or moral tradition nor does it need to be based 
upon religious views. It does, though, have to be moral in character as opposed to being based 
on values of some other sort.  
 
In addition to these two modifications of Miola’s criteria, I should add that there is a third 
criterion which he neglects. Conscience must be inward-facing. A decision of conscience is about 
the conduct of the person claiming conscience. Conscience is about my actions, not the actions 
of other people. A statement that others ought not to lie is a moral claim but it is not conscience-
based because it deals primarily with the views of others. A conscience-based claim would be 
one which argued that I should not engage in lying because it would violate some ethical or 
moral precept I hold. Even in a situation where the conscience-based refusal may appear to be 
actions of others (e.g. a doctor refusing to perform a termination of pregnancy because of the 
                                                 
2 In this, Miola follows Ian Kennedy. Miola specifically references The Unmasking of Medicine [13] 
but Kennedy makes a similar point in Treat Me Right [14].  
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patient’s lifestyle), the refusal is still inward-facing because the doctor’s claim is that she could not 
perform the termination. Conscience, then, is the subset of ethics and morality that deals with 
our own conduct and not the conduct of others. 
 
I wish to be clear about what is meant by “inward-facing” and “our own conduct”. Carolyn 
McLeod [16] and Françoise Baylis [4] have both contested what they call the “dominant view” of 
conscience becausethat it is individual. They both argue that conscience comes from and is 
modified – at least in part – by social, community, religious and family factors [16], [4]. In other 
words, no person is an island and our moral views , like our views on most things, never arise 
spontaneously out of ourselves but have a host of influences. Whether or notEven if this is a 
sufficient basis for attacking what they term the dominant view,4 it does not mean that 
conscience is not inward-facing. Inward-facing means that a claim of conscience is specific to the 
speaker. The individual in question is the object of the statement and not other people. In other 
words, Tthe statement ‘I cannot act in that way because it violates my conscience’ makes sense; 
‘you should not act in that way because it violates my conscience’ does not. My conscience is 
only a compelling reason for me to act in particular ways. It does not, without more, provide a 
reason for others. Thus, Wwe can talk about the idea of respecting conscience as a justification 
for me to act in particular ways, but a decision of conscience itself does not provide any 
justification for my actions if it is your conscience.    
 
These three criteria – that a decision is based upon moral values, is the subject toof ownership by 
the individual, and is about the individual’s own conduct – are the basis for someone to claim 
that a decision is based upon conscience and, consequently, for a claim that decision ought to be 
respected by others. Any decision, to be able to claim conscience, must have these three 
elements. Notice, Hhowever, that three additional elements are not required for a decision of 
conscience. First, a claim of conscience need not be based upon rules. There is no requirement 
that a decision of conscience needs to be consistent with other decisions a person makes nor 
does it require any coherent set of moral rules. This is consistent with the view of conscience put 
forward by Fovargue and Neal. [9]. In their article, Fovargue and NealThey argue that it is ‘too 
onerous’ for a decision to fit within a coherent set of beliefs. They also state that it is ‘unclear’ 
why it must be part of a system and they believe that it might privilege beliefs based upon a 
religious system over others. In addition, aA decision of conscience can be, and often probably 
is, a ‘gut-decision’ one in which an individual may feel there is something wrong without 
necessarily being able to articulate the reasons for why it is wrong.5 Second, a conscience-based 
                                                                                                                                                       
3 There is considerable research on the ability to choose without having options. See, e.g., the 
work of Fischer and Ravizza on moral responsibility [7], [8]. 
4 I have my doubts as to whether either McLeod’s or Baylis’ criticisms are really about the 
conception of conscience or serve as a persuasive refutation of the dominant view of people like 
Childress [6] or Wiccair [26]. Nothing, as far as I can tell, in the writings of either Childress or 
Wiccair indicate they would object to the notion that the moral principles which form the 
foundation of a conscience claim are at least partially determined by social factors. Moreover, 
McLeod’s criticisms seem to be more about the application of conscience than its conception, 
and Baylis, for me anyway, seems to conflate moral reasoning generally with conscience. 
However, there is insufficient space to discuss either view fully in the context of this paper. 
5 Baylis, in contrast, argues that conscience claims need to be ‘thoughtful, reflective, inner 
deliberations’ [4], but I disagree. We often use conscience as what some refer to as a ‘moral nose’ 
[10] and what I have referred to as aor ‘gut feeling’. One of the objections thatIndeed people, 
people sometimes haveobject to conscience becauseis that it is not necessarily based upon 
reason. As a consequence, it need not be thoughtful at least if we take thoughtful to mean a 
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decision based on conscience also does not need to be predictable, since it need not be based on 
a coherent system of rules. If an individual cannot specify a rule or set of rules which governs 
their behaviour, there is also no requirement that she be able to tell others in advance when a 
claim of conscience might arise.6 This does not mean, of course, that a “gut” feeling based on 
conscience is necessarily subject to the same deference that we might give a more thought-out 
decision of conscience. Nor does this mean we should avoid evaluating and exploring these gut 
decisions in order to make sure they have a sufficiently moral basis. Gut feelings need not be 
based upon moral reasons but might, instead, be based on other sorts of reasons such as bias or 
prejudice. A gut feeling based upon a non-moral basis, however, is not one which we could claim 
as being conscience-based and thus would not form part of our discussion on conscience. Gut 
feeling type cases which are based on moral reasons, though,, should be included because of the 
encompassing nature of conscience are conscience-based. Furthermore, as noted in the 
introduction, there may be a complex set of rules and circumstances such that, while it is not 
possible to predict behaviour or generalise beyond an abstract level, there is a consistent 
application of a reasoned process by the individual in question. Someone might, for example, be 
able to articulate that they object to treatment in a particular case because it would be ‘too much’ 
without having been able in advance to specify what ‘too much’ might be. In other words, some 
cases only cause problems with our conscience when they appear and not beforehand. 
Consequently, I would endorse the view taken by Fovargue and Neal’s view that it must be 
possible to articulate the basis of the position in a general way without a necessary requirement 
about being able to focus on a specific set of rules which apply in a particular case. Furthermore, 
aAny reflection necessary to be able to articulate the basis of the position can occur after the 
decision although that does not eliminate the requirement, also stated by Fovargue and Neal, 
that the position be sincere [9]. 
 
Finally, in addition to these two elements, conscience decisions do not necessarily need to be 
‘correct’. A claim of conscience, like any other type of moral claim,   may be based upon faulty or 
insufficient information. It may be based upon, incorrect reasoning or,   bias or prejudice. Since, 
as McLeod and Baylis note,   there is a social aspect to the creation of our moral systems, this is 
as likely to affect our decisions on the basis of conscience as it is any other moral decision [16], 
[4]. Claims may also be inconsistent with other moral values that we hold. Claims of conscience, 
then, do not require a claim to rightness, objective or otherwise. All that is required is that a 
claim is important to the individual and guides her actions by providing moral reasons for doing 
or not doing a particular action. 
 
Using this conception of conscience, the kind of individualised decisions I have in mind can fit 
within the general concept of conscience. They are based upon moral values. These moral values 
can be claimed by an individual as being within their ownershipsubject to ownership by the 
individual. They can specify that, in the case at hand,   the decision is one for which they have 
                                                                                                                                                       
reflective moral process must happen before the decision arises. While we can, and should, 
require that individuals be able to articulate after the fact why they believe their decision to be a 
conscience-based one, it does not seemis not necessary to require it beforehand. Fovargue and 
Neal have a similar claim which requires that the individual be able to ‘articulate’ their view but 
does not require ‘thoughtfulness’ in the way that Baylis appears to mean. [9]. 
6 I disagree with Fovargue and Neal on this point who argue for a limited ‘duty to disclose one’s 
position in advance provided this does not place [healthcare practitioners] at undue risk.’ [9]. I do 
not disagree that fForewarning ought to be done in situations where it is possible but 
forewarning may not be possiblethis is unlikely in the ‘too far’ types of cases which are the focus 
of this article.  
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made a particular choice. Finally, these decisions are inward-facing. They are about the views, 
thoughts and actions of the individual in question, not about what others ought necessarily to 
do. A doctor can make a claim that in a particular case she will not do X without making any 
normative statements about what others ought toshould do in the same case.  
 
III. Conscience and decision-making 
 
Whether these kinds of claims fall within a general categoryare called ‘conscience’ is only part of 
the issue. It is also important to explore how these kinds of conscience claims interact with other 
reasons within the doctors’ general decision-making process in which doctors engage. Both 
Savulescu and Miola see doctors’ decisions as susceptible to being categorised. Miola specifies 
that doctors can engage in conscience-based decisions or in decisions based upon technical 
medical skill [19]. Conscience decisions may also be constrained and overruled by professional 
duties. Similarly, Savulescu seems to create a binary system where doctors either engage in their 
professional duties or make conscience-based objections to do something else [22], [23]. He 
further suggests that conscience-based objections can be contrasted with decisions in the best 
interests of the patient [22], [23]. Both Miola and Savulescu, then, argue for a system in which we 
determine what category a specific decision falls within and that provides at least a strong (if not 
entirely determinative) argument on how those decisions ought to be treated. 
 
Real decision-making, however,   is unlikely to work in quite this clear a way. Doctors’ decisions 
are most likely to involve a range of different reasons which come together to shape a final 
choice. TIndeed, there are probably at least four different kinds of reasons which combine to 
form a decision.7 The first is what Miola refers to as ‘technical medical skill’. This is also often 
referred to as ‘clinical judgement’, but my preference is for ‘technical medical skill’ is better 
because it more clearly distinguishes this type of reason from the more nebulous use of ‘clinical 
judgement’ which might include other types of reason which go beyond the application of   a 
technical skill. Technical medical skill refers to anything which is exclusively within the purview 
of the medical professional. This includes matters such as whether a particular drug or treatment 
would be effective in a particular situation, and includes knowledge of particular risks of a drug 
or treatment (but not the application of that knowledge). Thus, for example, it would be 
technical medical skill to know that a surgery would provide a certain percentage risk of 
impotence, but the decision on how to classify and act on that risk would not be a matter of 
technical medical skill. Technical medical skill is part of every decision a doctor might make in 
relation to treatment, but is only likely to be substantially at issue in a case where a patient 
requests something that a doctor does not believe to be effective. Such might be the case where 
a patient requests a treatment that they learned about through the internet but that the doctor 
knows would not be useful in the particular case. This kind of reason is also at issue when, for 
example, parents refuse to have their children vaccinated for other than medical reasons.  
 
The second type of reason which will forms part of a doctor’s decision-making process is that of 
professional requirements. These include two important elements – professional ethical codes 
and responsibilities, and legal duties. Both the codes of professional bodies like the UK’s 
General Medical Council and legal duties set down by statutes and the courts provide reasons for 
doctors to behave in particular ways. They may override both the technical medical skill of the 
doctor as well as other important aspects of their reasoning process. For example, Robert Smith 
                                                 
7 I say ‘at least’ because there are types of reason which are possible but I will exclude from this 
analysis. This would include things like personal preferences and biases, views toward risk-taking, 
etc. which might have an impact upon decisions. 
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was a surgeon who came to prominence for what many saw as an unethical treatment for 
amputee identity disorder.8 Smith’s proposed treatment was to amputate the offending limb [24]. 
He claimed that those who underwent this treatment had beneficial results with limited side-
effects. In particular, hHe claimed that this treatment was more effective than alternative 
treatments available to patients [24]. Despite this, he was forbidden from providing this 
treatment to patients who requested it, primarily because the Trust where he worked was 
concerned that it violated his professional duties, both ethical (e.g. the duty of non-maleficence) 
and legal [24]. Professional requirements, especially ethical codes of conduct, may sometimes 
look like a matter of conscience but they are different. Whereas aA claim of conscience is an 
individual decision which is based partially upon a notion of ownership by the individual making 
the claim, professional requirements are not.   A professional requirement applies whether or not 
the doctor in question actually agrees with it. A claim of conscience, on the other handhowever, 
is only applicable if the doctor in question believes it to apply. 
 
The third aspect of a doctor’s decision-making process is the best interests of the patient. This is 
a determination by the doctor of what, considering non-medical as well as medical factors, would 
actually be best for the patient under the circumstances. Both legal and ethical theories 
emphasise that this decision should be made from the patient’s perspective rather than the 
doctor’s [2]. It is not, then, what the doctor believes they would want under the same 
circumstances that the patient is in; it is what is best for this patient in these circumstances [2]. 
Legally this is covered in English law by the Mental Capacity Act 2005, [17] for patients who lack 
the capacity to consent for themselves and by the consent of the patient for those who are.9 
Ethically, this is covered by the duty of beneficence [5]. As a consequence, it might be tempting 
to claim merely that the best interests of the patient are covered by the professional 
responsibilities that a doctor has. However, tThere are significant benefits to seeing best interests 
as a distinct set of reasons. Law and ethical guidance only set the appropriate test for what a 
doctor ought to do in these circumstances. They do not always provide detailed guidance. Even 
something like the Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice [18] (which is more detailed) does not 
necessarily provide a specific answer in each circumstance. Therefore tTwo doctors, both acting 
reasonably, may come to different conclusions as to what constitutes the best interests of a 
patient in particular circumstances.10 Best interests, then, is the application of a particular legal 
                                                 
8 Amputee identity disorder is when an individual believes that a limb that forms part of their 
body is ‘alien’ and does not belong to them. A person with this condition might feel, for 
instance, that their right arm should not be there. 
9 There are some semantic difficulties in a legal analysis which includes this kind of claim of best 
interests. In law, best interests only apply to those who lack capacity. [17]. The best interests test, 
as a legal doctrine,, then, would not apply to competent patients for whom the applicable idea is 
consent and autonomy. However, by best interests in this section, I mean a more general 
understanding of what is best for the patient whether or not they have capacity. It would thus 
include both incompetent and competent patients. In this sense, then, it is different from and 
more inclusive of the legal test. The reason I have chosen to refer to this as best interests is 
because the doctor is likely to use a similar thought process and metric – whether the possible 
treatment option is best for the welfare of the patient irrespective of whether the patient is 
competent or not. The way that metric is applied will sometimes be different, of course (doctors 
may concede to a competent patient’s determination even if it is not the decision they would 
make in terms of an incompetent patient) but the relevant thought process is similar. 
10 Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P. has argued that ‘logically’, the best interests test ought to only 
give one answer. In Re S [21] at 27-28. This is disputed by, among others, Holm and Edgar [11]. I 
think eEven if   Butler-Sloss is correct that there is one logical best interests answer for each 
 
7 
 
and ethical test and it is worthwhile to explore those reasons rather than merely to set out the 
test under professional requirements. Professional requirements, as I shall consider them, 
constrain doctors in specific and predictable ways. The best interests analysis, on the other hand, 
is a more nuanced and fact-specific set of reasons. Additionally, it is worth separating out best 
interests and professional regulations because they have different objects. Professional 
regulations are about compliance with a set of rules – either legal or ethical. The focus, then, of 
professional regulation is on those rules. On the other hand, while set up by rules, tThe focus of 
the best interests analysis is the patient. Indeed, it is possible that those two can conflict. As noted 
above, Robert Smith seems to believe that amputating a healthy limb of a patient with amputee 
identity disorder is in the best interests of that patient, even when it conflicts with the 
professional requirements that he might have , at least as they are generally perceived [24].  
 
It is also worth distinguishing best interests from conscience. The two may look similar and 
courts appear to be useing the best interests testanalysis to disguise situations where what is 
really at issue is a decision of conscience. For example, in the case Aintree v. James [2], while the 
Court of Appeal focuses on the ‘best interests’ of David James, it seems more likely that the real 
problem is a decision of conscience on the part of the doctors’ conscience [25]. Aintree v. James, it 
should be noted, takes place in the context of the Mental Capacity Act which sets out the 
applicable rules for doctors to follow. Most specifically, iIt states that in the context of 
determining what to do for incompetent patients, as David James was, doctors are required to 
utilise the best interests test. [17]. So, it is understandable why the courts talk in terms of best 
interests in the case instead of conscience. Nevertheless, a close look at the application of what 
they term best interests is actually more likely to be something based on conscience. [25]. A 
primeThe way to distinguish between the two is, as with best interests and professional 
requirements,   the object of the reason. As noted above, tThe focus of a best interests analysis is 
the patient. It is what is best for the patient to receive. In the context of a claim of conscience, 
though, the focus is on the doctor. It is what the doctor feels able to provide. It is not about what 
is better for the patient under the circumstances, because it might be the case that what is best 
for the patient is not something the doctor feels able to offer. These may conflict in particular 
cases. It may be the case that in a particular case, a doctor feels that she cannot give a patient a 
specific treatment even if, under a best interests analysis, it would actually be the best choice for 
the patient. In Aintree v. James, everyone appears to accept the idea that David James would have 
preferred to survive – no one disputed that he appeared to continue to derive pleasure from 
what he was able to do. What the doctors objected to was the requirement that they provide 
treatment which they felt would be horrible to provide. In other words, mMerely because it is 
considered ‘best’ for a patient does not mean that a doctor must do it. It is entirely possible that 
there are other conscience-based reasons why a doctor might not wish to provide that 
treatment.11 So, even though the case was purportedly about best interests as specified by the 
Mental Capacity Act, the real determining factor was the doctor’s conscience. 
 
Treatment decisions, then, are not based upon a single reason but a combination of the four 
aspects of decision-making noted above. Decisions about treatment are rarely just decisions of 
technical medical skill, or of professional regulations, or of best interests or of conscience. 
Instead, in decisions about treatment a doctor makes a complex judgment about what treatments 
are clinically available and allowed by professional regulations in the light of what is best for the 
                                                                                                                                                       
individual, there is no guarantee that everyone would agree as to what that is. 
11   Another case for which this appears to be is a primary issue is the removal of Ms B from a 
ventilator, although there is no explicit mention of conscience in that case. Re B (adult: refusal of 
treatment) [3]. For a discussion of that case in relation to conscience, see [25]. 
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patient and what the doctor feels individually able to provide in terms of their conscience. While 
in certain cases one element of this decision-making process might become the most important, 
all are likely towill have some effect upon the ultimate decision. It is, therefore, crucial not only 
to understand the different types of reasons which might influence decisions by doctors, but also 
to comprehend the interaction between them. Disentangling notions of best interests and 
conscience might be the most difficult. Both are, in some sense, subjective and personal rather 
than objectively determined by an outside element (e.g., medical technology, law or professional 
codes of conduct). Additionally , under current law, doctors might often be forced to disguise 
what is actually a claim of conscience behind a claim of best interests or capacity which will 
further add otto the confusion as it did in Aintree v. James [22]. Furthermore, as conscience is 
based upon moral or ethical principles, a claim based on beneficence might straddle the line 
between the two possibilities. A doctor might claim, for example,   that providing some 
particular treatment to a patient both is not in the best interests of that patient as well as 
violating the ethical principles that ground the doctor’s conscience.        
 
One effective way to determine whether a claim made by a doctor is one of conscience or best 
interests is to closely examine the language used by the doctor. If a doctor makes the claim that, 
under their understanding of the interests of the patient, a particular treatment ought not to be 
given but would be willing to change their opinion after listening to arguments from the patient 
that a different treatment was better, then it is more likely to be a claim of best interests than of 
conscience. If however the doctor indicates that, even if the patient disagreed with the doctor’s 
assessment, they still would not change their mind (and it is not a matter of technical medical 
skill), then this is more likely to be a conscience-based claim. This is the case because the The 
statement of the doctor in the latter case helps to show that the focus of the decision is more on 
what the doctor is willing to provide than what the patient ought to receive.  
 
We might then conceive of a doctor’s decision-making process as a result of four questions. 
They are: 
 
1. Is this particular treatment option possible or feasible? (the technical medical skill 
question) 
2. Is this particular treatment option generally acceptable in these cases? (the professional 
regulation question) 
3. Is this particular treatment option good for this particular patient?12 (the best interests 
question) 
 4. Can I provide this treatment consistently with my own conscience? (the conscience question) 
 
Considering these four different questions involves different purposes and foci, yet all of them 
will need to be asked in any case. They might not of course be asked in anything more than a 
perfunctory way, especially in standard treatment cases, but all of them are relevant and 
important in in whatever final decision the doctor makes. Decisions based on such a confluence 
of different factors will not then fall into an easy category from which we can decide whether the 
decision as a whole is acceptable or not. If tThe decisions of doctors are complex, ; then we need 
to account for that complexity when we determine whether the answers they give are appropriate 
or not. 
 
It is also worth highlighting that while these are listed as separate questions above, they are likely 
in their application. So, while dDoctors will need to consider all four questions in some way but,  
guarantee they are likely towill do so in a way that sees these questions as distinct questions. 
circles then they do independent silos. Answers to one question are likely to influence the 
questions. That does not matter, however, for the purposes of the analysis we are considering. 
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separable concerns, even if they are unlikely to be considered as wholly separate questions. 
 
IV. Deciding between competing strands 
 
Since the decision-making process that a doctor must go through in order to decide about a 
treatment option is formed of by at least these four questions, there needs to be a way to decide 
betweeprioritise n the answers to those questions in cases where they do not align. If,  for 
example, a doctor decides that a particular treatment option is feasible, best for the patient and 
consistent with their conscience but is not generally acceptable, then a doctor will need to 
determine whether, nonetheless, they still ought to do it.13 We need to understand not only to 
understand the types of questions that ought to be asked but also how those questions interact 
with each other. 
 
Someone taking Savulescu’s view would is presumably argue that only the first three questions 
actually matter and that the fourth should not be part of any official evaluation of the doctor’s 
decision even if the doctor actually used it to decide. Doing that , however, causes more 
problems than it solves. First, if it forms part of the actual decision-making process but not part 
of the analysis of that decision, the analysis is almost necessarily distorted. Furthermore, 
excluding it from the analysis simply prevents the conscience-based reason from being subject to 
scrutiny. It does not stop a decision of conscience being made, just the ability to evaluate it. 
More importantly, though, failing to analyse the conscience-based reasoning that forms a part of 
decision-making by doctors neglects the important role that conscience plays in medicine. Just 
because something is technically feasible, not prohibited by any current professional regulation 
and that thing is what best for the patient wants it does not follow thatmean that thing ought to 
be done. Treatments like frequent plastic surgery are technically feasible and not against the law, 
certain individuals might want them, and they might even be ‘best’ for the particular patient on 
whichever metric we use. That does not mean that doctors oughtDoctors still need not to offer 
them. It is the doctor’s conscience which provides the most effective way , at least on an 
individual level, to prevent these kinds of practices because they can simply refuse to do it.14  
 
What is more effective is a Bbalancing between the various reasons involved in the ultimate 
decision that the doctor makes is more effective. We want a doctor to explain not only the 
answers to the four different questions outlined above but the way in which those answers 
influenced the overall final decision which was made. Were, for example, the professional 
of the process that the doctor used in making a particular decision and this, in turn, will provide 
number of additional benefits. The doctor is likely towill have a clearer understanding of their 
reasoning if they can outline the process by which they reached their conclusion. Patients will 
have a greater understanding of what a doctor sees as important within a particular case and how 
this influences the overall decision made by the doctor. Patients can then use this information to 
be better able to discuss potential treatment options with their doctor or seek another doctor’s 
                                                 
13 This, for example, appears to be the reasoning of doctors and other healthcare workers 
involved in things like the euthanasia underground [15]. 
14 There are, of course, macro-level options like distributive justice or resource management 
which are available to determine the best way forward in cases. These include decisions made on 
the basis of some general theory of distributive justice or resource management. However, these 
kinds of considerations are supposed to only apply in general and not in the context of particular 
patients. Doctors, for example, ought not decide to let a patient die because they have a wealth 
of organs available even if that was a ‘better’ decision in distributive justice or resource 
management terms. 
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services if necessary. Those who might need to evaluate the doctor’s decision in more objective 
settings (judges, health care authorities, professional bodies) can do so without having to 
first. Finally, conscience can be discussed as a more generalised phenomenon, not simply as 
something which impedes an objective treatment decision but one which enhances not only the 
doctor’s ability to do their jobs in a more honest manner, but allows for the exploration of a 
number of different treatment options.  
 
It is crucial to realise that this decision-making process need not be the same for all doctors or 
situations. For example, Robert Smith appears to have decided that the professional regulations 
trump what might seem to be the answers for the other three questions in regards to amputee 
identity disorder [25]. By his own understanding, it was feasible to amputate the healthy limb, he 
considered it best for the patient and he appeared to be willing to do it. However, because the 
hospital deemed it unacceptable, he did not perform the amputations. We can then reasonably 
infer that he deemed the answer to the second question most important. On the other hand, 
there were a number of doctors (and other healthcare professionals) involved in the euthanasia 
underground detailed in Robert Magnusson’s Angels of Death [15]. These doctors, in contrast, 
appear to have helped patients to die despite the fact that assisted dying was prohibited in their 
jurisdictions both legally and by the standard professional ethics codes. These doctors, then, 
presumably decided that the answer to the second question was less important than the answers 
to the other three.Some might prioritise professional codes of conduct like Robert Smith [25]; 
others might prioritise conscience like the doctors in the euthanasia underground [15]. It is, 
therefore, not the case that one of the four questions will always prevail in all situations. This 
balancing is not a mathematical formula but instead merely a guide to understanding the relative 
importance of the reasons which impact upon the final decision that a doctor makes. What it 
does provide, nevertheless, is a method by which doctors can engage in reflection about their 
decision-making process. It allows them to sift through the complex reasons they might have for 
performing or not performing particular treatment options and explain why a decision was 
reached in a specific case. This process will be useful in many types of cases, but might be 
especially helpful in those cases which are not determined in the rule-based, predictive way that 
has been considered standard in conscientious objection cases in the past. 
 
One result of this decision-making model is that it applies equally to the types of rule-based 
conscientious objection claims as well as the individualised claims of conscience which may be 
more difficult to assess. Even in the rule-based claims, we would expect doctors to engage in the 
type of reasoning suggested above. What is different in rule-based claims is that the fourth strand 
of reason – the conscience reason - trumps the other three reasons irrespective of the answer. 
We would expect doctors in these situations to have given due consideration to the feasibility 
and acceptability of the treatment as well as the best interests of the patient even if the 
conscience decision ultimately controls it. This might be one of the reasons why we object so 
strongly to doctors who claim a conscientious objection in cases in which the patient appears not 
to have been considered. Our objection in those cases is not to the conscience-based objection 
but to the giving of insufficient weight to the interests of the patient, whatever they might be. 
decision-making is particularly appropriate when we explore cases where doctors have made a 
conscience-based objection to a particular treatment to a particular patient at a particular time, it 
is a model which can be applied across the board. 
 
A criticism, however, might be raised to this approach on the basis of an argument recently made 
by Jonathan Montgomery. Montgomery argues that conscientious objection should cover actions 
associated with professional judgment and not personal values. As he states, these are issues 
associated with the ‘moral identity of the profession, irrespective of personal views.’ 
Montgomery’s concern is that allowing personal values to dictate when a doctor is willing to 
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engage in a particular treatment provides too much power to the doctor to make decisions based 
creating a system which provides healthcare as a common good provided by society for its 
members. While I share his concerns and I think he and I probably agree more than we 
I would take issue with his understanding that professional discretion is easily separable from 
values. Montgomery seems to take professional judgment as something more objective than I 
believe it can be. Doctors are human beings and thus filter their understanding of particular 
views and values. As a consequence, Consequently, all professional judgments necessarily include 
personal values. If that is correct, then it would not beis not possible to differentiate between the 
professional and personal quite as easily as Montgomery suggests. Thus, conscience needs to be 
considered as a distinct element in part of the decision-making process. 
 
V. Conclusion  
 
The purpose of this article has been to explore how we might encapsulate the decision-making 
of doctors so that we can better account for the conscience-based reasons which permeate 
medical care. Some wWriters such as Savulescu argue that doctors ought not to be allowed to 
make decisions on the basis of conscience and instead should only abide by their professional 
duties. This article has claimed not just that conscience ought not to be side-lined in this way and 
moreover also that it is not possible to do so. All decisions that doctors make are based on a 
multi-faceted collection of reasons which include strands based upon technical medical skill, 
professional codes of conduct, and the best interests of the patient as well as the doctor’s 
conscience. Moreover, all four strands are necessary and important parts of a doctor’s reasoning 
process. We need not protect conscience absolutely in medical cases, but we need to understand 
that it has a crucial part to play in a large collection of cases. It is, therefore,   more important to 
understand the connection between conscience-based reasons and the other reasons at issue in a 
case, than to dismiss these conscientious claims entirely.     
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